Tutoring technology through OEM arrangement by Cyhn, Jin W.
THE JOURNAL OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 2003), 195-223 
Tutoring Technology through OEM Arrangement:  
Case of Japan's NEC and Korea's DEC* 
 
Jin W. Cyhn**  
 
 
There have been many studies on technological learning, especially 
as it relates to the latecomer firms from developing countries.  
However, unlike the current literature, this study argues that in order to 
overcome various challenges in technological learning, close 
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diagnosis of the learner's initial capabilities, the learning firms are able 
to set a higher standard for learning, making them more successful and 
efficient.  The article, which is based on the case study of two firms 
involved in original equipment manufacture (OEM), shows that the 
effectiveness of technological learning is determined to a great extent 
by the technology originator's tutorials.  A simple analytical frame-
work is presented to explain why this is so.  This study also attempts to 
contribute to the growing literature on international production network, 
with OEM as its modality.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this study is to analyze the process of technology 
development for developing countries (DCs) and highlight the significance of 
interaction between DC firms and multinational enterprises (MNEs).  Ever 
since Adam Smith noted of a pin factory which increased the quality and 
quantity of output without equivalent input, the study of economic 
development has been giving its active attention to the impact of learning and 
specialization which seem to enhance not only productivity, but also overall 
product quality.  Arrow's (1962) seminal work further linked the concepts of 
learning and productivity increase, and technological learning (TL) has been 
considered as an endogenous ingredient behind productivity increase and 
technology development as a whole.  TL has also been included in the 
recent new growth theories as a component for increasing returns.  For DCs, 
the TL literature has concentrated on the accumulation of technological 
capabilities (TCs) – that is, the process of DCs's accumulation of TCs and 
industrial competitiveness are considered part of the learning process. 
Studies have identified a number of factors that influence the process and 
effectiveness of TL.  In terms of its effectiveness, there has been a debate on 
the role of the government versus market forces as the key factor, for 
example.  In terms of its process, the literature has identified the 
incremental steps (the trilogy of adoption, adaptation, and innovation) as well 
as leap-frogging steps (including the reliance of the others's, fore-runners's 
R&D expenditure).  However, while the current literature has provided 
much understanding on TL, it has not analyzed in detail the significance of 
the interactive nature of TL.  This study argues that as technology (as target 
of learning) becomes more sophisticated, its tacit elements become more 
significant, thereby increasing the importance of the role of the originator of 
technology (often MNEs) as the potential 'tutors' of technology.  Hence, this 
article highlights and analyzes the process itself as a main determinant of 
TL's effectiveness.   
This study explores this issue through a case study on the interactive 
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learning process of Japan's Nippon Electronics Company (NEC) and Korea's 
Daewoo Electronics Company (DEC).  NEC engaged in an original equip-
ment manufacturing (OEM) arrangement with DEC during the 1980s, where 
Korea (and DEC) was considered as a learner.1) In asking DEC to provide 
specific sets of products (consumer electronics items), NEC has transferred 
not only hardware and blueprint-oriented technologies, but also the implicit, 
uncodified technologies that are based largely on practical know-how and 
experience.  It was through this active interaction that DEC became an 
effective learner, learning what and how to learn.  This article further 
provides a simple framework on the interactive nature of the TL, based on 
the case study and review of literature.   
Overall, OEM mainly involves supplying firms manufacturing finished 
equipment to the buyer's specifications, to be sold under the buyer's brand 
name.  OEM buyers specify the design, packaging, styling and quality 
requirements to the suppliers. They also investigate facilities, manufacturing 
systems and quality control programs, and provide advice to the suppliers.   
In many OEMs, the buyers also provide their own engineers who will act as 
trouble-shooters.    
OEM can be further described as vertical quasi-integration (see Blois 
1972) or as obligational subcontracting (see Williamson 1985).  The major 
differences are that OEM is related to inter-firm arrangement that involves 
buyers (MNEs) and suppliers (DC firms), and that it usually lasts longer than 
'typical, arms-length' subcontracting without necessarily involving equity 
investments.  As indicated in the industrial organization literature, this type 
of arrangement can be advantageous for both parties, as both tend to form 
stable, long-term relationships that reduce transaction costs as well as 
principal-agent problems while establishing the inter-firm settings for 
technological partnership. 
OEM reflects the recent phenomenon in international business tying the 
                                                
1) OEM mainly involves supplying firms manufacturing finished equipment to the 
specifications of the buyer, to be sold under the buyer's brand name. For more detailed 
analysis, also see Cyhn (2002).  
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MNEs' vertical integration and subcontracting activities in international 
production network (IPN).  With the increasingly globalized economic 
world, observers have witnessed a rapid rise in IPN, as indicated via 
increasingly inter-regional activities of MNEs and non-equity inter-firm 
strategic alliances.  The reasons for the recent rise in IPN seem clear.  For 
technology-sensitive sectors such as electronic products, the definition of 
standards is a critical element of competition: product life cycles are short, 
and technological change is rapid and subject to disruptive innovations.  In 
such markets, cost-competitiveness must be combined with product 
differentiation and speed to market.  Cross-border networks allow firms to 
combine these very different market demands effectively (Borrus et al. 2000). 
OEM reflects the recent phenomenon in international business tying the 
MNEs' vertical integration and subcontracting activities in international 
production network (IPN).  With the increasingly globalized economic 
world, observers have witnessed a rapid rise in IPN, as indicated via 
increaseeingly inter-regional activities of MNEs and non-equity inter-firm 
strategic alliances.  The reasons for the recent rise in IPN seem clear.  For 
technology-sensitive sectors such as electronic products, the definition of 
standards is a critical element of competition: product life cycles are short, 
and technological change is rapid and subject to disruptive innovations.  In 
such markets, cost-competitiveness must be combined with product different-
iation and speed to market.  Cross-border networks allow firms to combine 
these very different marke t demands effectively (Borrus et al., 2000). 
Currently, there is only a small number of studies recognizing the 
significance of OEM (see Cyhn, 2002; Ernst, 1994; Hobday, 1995).  
Although these studies have delineated its significance and described the 
benefits and costs to both suppliers and buyers, a more conceptualized 
analysis of OEM as an (IPN-oriented) arrangement is still lacking in the 
literature.  These studies have tended to describe the arrangement, and then 
directly engage in the case studies to analyze its impact.  This article hopes 
to make a contribution to this newly growing literature by offering a more 
detailed and theoretically conceptualized analysis on OEM (and IPN) – based 
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on the literatures from the (i) multinational enterprises, (ii) subcontracting, 
(iii) vertical integration, and (iv) exporting and technology transfer.  OEM's 
relation to IPN and TL will also be surveyed.   Through this analysis, this 
article further aims to explain the motivations and strategies of both suppliers 
and buyers of OEM, and how it has allowed the selected East Asian firms to 
upgrade their technological and export competitiveness.   
The next section provides a brief literature review on the study of TL.  It 
is followed by an analysis of the interactive nature of TL, which highlights 
the significance of tutors of technology.  Then, a case study of the 
interactive relationship between NEC and DEC is presented, based on their 
OEM arrangement.  The Conclusion summarizes and identifies a number of 
implications arising from this study.   
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Before the main issues can be addressed, a brief list of concepts and 
terminology needs to be presented.  Generally, technology can be defined as 
an applied collection and assembly of knowledge which may also include 
scientific innovations.  It is considered as organized (formal or informal) 
discovery, learning, and application of mechanical engineering.  For this 
study, technology is further considered as the accumulated set of experience, 
knowledge, and expertise that are commonly expressed through new 
management, organization, invention or innovation of processes and products.  
Technological change occurs when this new information is acquired and 
utilized in the production of goods. 
There are three important aspects of technology as knowledge good.  The 
first is the universal versus specific aspect – that is, some elements represent 
widely applicable understanding and direct scientific knowledge or 
knowledge related to well-known and pervasive applicable princ iples, while 
other areas of knowledge are specific to particular 'ways of doing things', the 
experience of the producer, the user, or both.  The second aspect is 
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articulated versus tacit – that is, some aspects of knowledge are well-
articulated, even written down in considerable detail in manuals or articles, 
and taught in schools.  Others are largely tacit, mainly learned through 
practice and practical examples that cannot be entirely transmitted in an 
explicit, algorithmic form.  Lastly, there is the public versus private aspect – 
that is, some of the knowledge involved in the use and improvement of 
technologies is open and public.  The most obvious examples are scientific 
and technical publications.  However, other aspects are private, either 
'implicitly' because they are tacit anyway, or explicitly in the sense that 
secrecy or legal devices such as patents protect them. 
 
2.1. Definition and Process of Technological Learning 
 
TL can be defined as 'the way firms build and supplement their knowledge 
bases about technologies, products, and processes, and develop and improve 
the use of the broad skills of their work-forces' (Hobday, 1994, p. 832).  For 
DCs, TL begins with transferred technologies from more developed countries.  
Lall (1992, p. 181) stresses that '(DCs') ... technology development always 
needs technology imports from advanced countries'. 
The literature suggests that TL is costly, systematic, and active.  In stating 
that the learning processes of firms need to be routinized, Teubal (1987) 
believes that with constant market failures and other constraints, successful 
TL is a difficult but critical component of DCs's overall economic 
development.  In stressing the importance of the accumulation of learning 
capabilities (or 'learning to learn'), Stiglitz (1988) believes that the past half 
century has been marked not only by greater specialization in production, but 
also by greater specialization in learning.2) 
Technical knowledge and information often comes 'embodied' in foreign 
machinery and equipment; and since technology transfer does not necessarily 
                                                
2) Termed as 'localized learning,' Stiglitz also emphasizes that learning capability based on one 
area cannot be easily transferred to another. Just as technology cannot be simply purchased 
off the shelf, neither can TL easily be attained by simple market transaction. 
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include knowledge transfer, much of the development (learning or ability to 
'disembody' technological potential) remains the DC's own task.  
Technology is implicit in the sense that the seller always possesses more 
information about its use than could be embodied in the blueprints, training, 
etc.  sold to the buyer, and that its transfer accordingly involves a significant 
degree of uncertainty.  Based on the complex nature of technology as 
mentioned above, this also means that the DC's learning process should 
involve more than passively attaining foreign blue-prints from the 'freely 
available international shelf' (Katz, 1989).   
Most of the TL studies tend to be a variation (and an extension) of a series 
of adoption, adaptation, and diffusion.  In other words, when the detailed 
descriptions of the series of stages are simplified, they fundamentally address 
the stages of learning from foreign technologies into developing their own.  
Another way to interpret this process is acquisition and assimilation of 
foreign technology, followed by generation of own technology (Lee et al., 
1988).  It should be noted, however, that these steps are not to be considered 
in a linear sense, but more interactively.   
Overall, TL takes place within routine activities of production, distribution, 
and consumption, and produces important inputs to the process.  The 
everyday experiences of workers, production engineers, and sales 
representatives influence the agenda determining the direction of innovative 
efforts as they produce crucial knowledge and insights.  Such activities 
involve learning-by-doing (increasing the efficiency of production 
operations), learning-by-using (increasing the efficiency of the use of 
complex systems), and learning-by-interacting (involving users and 
producers in an interaction resulting in product innovation).  Thus, the most 
important forms of learning may be fundamentally regarded as interactive 
processes.  Furthermore, since innovation reflects learning and accumulated 
experience and know-how as much as it does novelty, and since learning 
arises partially out of routine activities, innovation will be firmly rooted in 
the prevailing economic structure.     
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2.2. Modalities for Technological Learning 
 
The literature has also identified and distinguished between different 
modalities of learning, which can be divided into three broad categories.  
The first relates to the internal source of TL.  This refers to those types that 
usually occur within the firm without necessarily having external input.3)  It 
can be considered as a form of 'self learning' – the increase in productivity 
and efficiency at the production level as well as the adoption of new 
technologies (product or production-based) are the main emphases here.  
The second type is the external source of TL.  This refers to those TL efforts 
that are largely dependent on external forces and refer to market mediation, 
such as purchasing or licensing new technologies.  Lastly, the interactive 
learning types, which can be considered a combination of both internal and 
external modes for TL, are highlighted in this study.  
For technology transfer and subsequent learning, arms-length, market-
mediated contracts can be arranged although they may face certain principal-
agent problems.  In other words, because the learners do not have complete 
information on the technology involved, they are uncertain about its 
effectiveness.  The transferability of TCs, as opposed to hardware, is critical 
to the DCs; and it further suggests that conventional market transaction may 
not be sufficient or appropriate.  As will be seen later, it appears that the 
issue of incentives is a critical component not only for technology transfer 
but also for the subsequent TL involved.  Thus, knowing that so much of 
technology can be based on experience and know-how – and other forms of 
implicit knowledge – it seems that the role of technology providers also play 
an important part. 
In sum, the first part of the literature review has shown that one of the 
major challenges for effective learning is technology's tacitness, meaning that 
the knowledge behind technology needs to be uncodified.  In terms of 
technology transfer, this also means that the buyer (also the learner) of 
                                                
3) It should be noted, however, that in essence, all types of TL involve absorbing foreign 
(external) technologies. 
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technology may not possess all the information necessary to fully absorb its 
uncodified elements.  This is mainly due to the fact that technology's main 
characteristics are the skills, routines, and operational practices that accrue 
from collective learning processes.  In terms of external sources of TL, 
technology cannot simply be purchased off the shelf.  This means that while 
the potential for external sources of learning is significant, practicality 
(technology's price, availability, and learners's capacity, among others) 
dictates that this will probably not be fulfilled.  With interactive learning, 
where the active involvement of the providers of technology is critical, it is 
important to determine if they have the incentives to offer the necessary 
knowledge on tacit elements to the learners.  If not, as with external 
learning, interactive learning may not really be 'interactive' – that is, it may 
also involve a type of arms-length transaction.  For the technology providers, 
such incentives are necessary if they are to actively assist the learners in 
disembodying the technology's tacitness.  This is a critical issue which will 
be discussed in succeeding sections.   
 
2.3. Framework for Interactive Learning 
 
This study focuses on OEM-induced learning between NEC and DEC as a 
case study.  OEM as an inter-firm arrangement seems to provide incentives 
for both learners and tutors for interactive TL opportunities.  It would be 
erroneous to suggest, however, that OEM will automatically lead to effective 
TL by supplier firms.  Observers require a more complex understanding of 
TL to study OEM, and it is that which this study aims to provide in the form 
of an analytical framework.   
The analytical framework presented here has several purposes.  First, it 
identifies four main factors of TL, namely: (i) technology importers (or 
learners), (ii) technology suppliers (or tutors), (iii) technology itself as target 
of learning, and (iv) arrangement in which technology transfer and learning 
occurs.  Second, the four components were selected to emphasize the 
interactive nature of TL.  Effective learners may induce more effective and 
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Figure  1  Analytical Framework 
 
 
sophisticated tutors, technologies and so forth.  Indeed, among the four 
factors, the learner's capabilities may be the most important.  However, there 
may be also cases where the efforts of willing and capable learners are 
hampered by the lack of corresponding transferors (or technology tutors), 
technologies, or by inadequate arrangements.  Thus, while these are 
overlapping components, there are also reasons why they need to be studied 
individually as well.  Even though effective technology transfer requires a 
variety of actions, the main issue still depends on the nature of the 
technology and the transferees.   
Third, this framework aims to allow a comparative study of OEM and 
other, more formal learning modes, such as licensing or FDI.  The other 
modes of technology transfer also encompass learning opportunities although 
often in different forms.  Also, as with other modes of technology transfer, 
OEM offers opportunities for both formal and informal means of technology 
transfer and subsequent learning.  The combination of the two are necessary, 
for in many instances, together they will lead not only to the inflow of 
technologies but also the knowledge, experience, and know-how of more 
(A) TECHNOLOGY LEARNER
1. Initial TCs and R&D Investments
2. Human & Physical Capital Investments
3. Firm’s Size, Ownership and Purpose
4. Export Activities and Market Share
5. Government and Societal Implications
(B) TECHNOLOGY TUTOR
1. Its Overall Intention on TL of Suppliers
2. Overall TC Reputation of Tutoring Firm
3. Willingness to Share Technology
4. Scope of Technology Tutorials
(E) EFFECTIVENESS OF TL
1. Product Development & Production TCs
2. Development of TL Capabilities
3. Innovation-Related Capabilities
4. Export Competitiveness & Market Share
(C) TECHNOLOGY (as Objective of TL)
1. Technology-Product Cycle 
2. Overall Sophistication (i.e., R&D Intensity) of
Technology
3. Nature of Technologies Needed for the Products
and Their Evolution
(D) TECH. LEARNING ARRANGEMENT
1. Overall Nature of the Contract (such as
Subcontract, OEM, Joint Venture, etc.)
2. Stability and Duration of Contract
3. Modes of Technology Transfer as Required by
the Arrangements
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advanced firms and engineers.  A more detailed description of the 
framework's major components is presented below:  
 
(i) Technology Learner (A) refers to DC (Korea in this case), OEM-supplier 
firms, attempting to adopt and adapt foreign technologies.  Here, the local 
firm's efforts in TL and TC acquisitions are largely analyzed through the 
levels of R&D and human capital investments, design capabilities, and export 
competitiveness.  Their TCs before and after the learning experience (OEM 
or otherwise) are also compared, as are their efforts to get OEM contracts 
while increasing their exports.  Their export activities and market share are 
analyzed.  The firms' management decisions, in terms of the TL route taken 
and the willingness to import foreign technologies, are also considered.   
 
(ii) Technology Tutor (B) usually refers to MNEs (i.e., OEM buyers), as they 
are also the source of technology for the DC firms.  Their capabilities and 
incentives to teach technologies are considered.  This includes the 
technologies they provide, the quantity and quality of the interactions 
(tutorials), and their effectiveness.  The role of the technology providers 
does not end when technologies are transferred.  The scope and 
effectiveness of technological support provided by them is an important 
factor for the overall success of the recipient's TL.   
 
(iii) Technology (C) itself is relevant, for some technologies induce more 
learning than others.  Through a more qualitative manner, the technology's 
scale, complexity, skill needs, and rate of change are also identified.  Every 
industry faces either a fluid or maturity stage that has an impact on its pace of 
TL.  In a fluid stage, product technologies change quickly and product 
differentiation is considered to be the most important aspect.  In a maturity 
stage, production technologies (efficiency) and price become more important 
than product differentiation (which itself becomes standardized).  Thus, in 
each type of technology, there are distinct (and evolving) dynamics for the 
learners and tutors. 
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(iv) Arrangement (D) in which the learning of technology occurs is analyzed.  
The incentives of both parties can be influenced by the arrangement in which 
they form their partnership.  The most positive ones seem to be those that 
are stable and long-term, with limited friction between the two parties.  The 
purpose of their arrangement (whether simply to meet short term OEM 
orders or as a long term strategic partnership) is identified.  Thus, OEM can 
be compared with other learning arrangements, mainly licensing and FDI.  
The other important considerations are firm management, the nature of the 
contract, length of arrangements, and modes of transfer and learning.   
 
(v) These factors largely account for the Effectiveness of TL (E).  This study 
will consider the effectiveness of factors such as changes in product and 
production development, especially in relation to technological upgrading.  
The development of TL capabilities is also important.  TL capability 
describes the ability of firms to learn more sophisticated technologies 
efficiently and effectively.  As the literature suggests, learning is not an 
automatic process and requires diverse capabilities.  The term 'learning to 
learn' can be applied here as well.  This leads the firm to more innovation-
oriented activities, combined with (independent) technological upgrading of 
its products.   
 
Even for TL at the firm level, the influence of government policies cannot 
be under-estimated, especially for Korea. Most notably, government 
measures can affect the capabilities and incentive of learners.  This is 
particularly true of the Korean government, with its numerous promotional 
and selective policies.  Government policy can also alter the motivation and 
incentive of the technology suppliers, such as the government's foreign 
technology import regulations.   
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3. CASE STUDY 
 
This section present the case study of OEM and technology tutorial 
experience between Korea's DEC and Japan's NEC.  It begins with a brief 
background analysis of the two companies, followed by the study on how 
DEC was able to learn from NEC within the modality of international 
production network (IPN) and OEM.4)   
 
3.1. Background of DEC and NEC 
 
DEC is part of the Daewoo Group, a major Korean chaebol.  Woo-
Choong Kim founded Daewoo in 1967 as a small-scale textile operation.  In 
1976, President Chung-Hee Park personally asked Kim to take over a loss-
making, state-owned machinery plant, thus giving rise to Daewoo Heavy 
Industry.  Since then Daewoo has diversified into cars, electronics, hotels, 
aerospace, chemicals, construction, computers and financial services.  It has 
grown into a family of twenty-six cross-held companies, with group sales 
totaling $68 billion in 1996. 
DEC was established in 1974 as an assembler of radios and amplifiers.  It 
recorded exports worth $2.6 million in its first year.  DEC then acquired 
Joo-Ahn Electronics in 1975 and Dae-Han Electronics in 1983; the former 
allowed DEC to become a major producer of radios, while the latter formed 
the core of its consumer electronics production.  With a large-scale plant in 
Kumi in 1976, DEC, along with LG (then known as Goldstar) and Samsung, 
became a major electronics manufacturer in Korea.5)   
By the early 1980s, DEC's four major plants possessed a high level of  
                                                
4) IPN refers to the increasingly globalized activities of MNEs based on non-equity inter-firm 
strategic alliances. Increasingly, international production – the production of goods and 
services in countries that is controlled and managed by firms headquartered in other 
countries – is becoming a core of the process of globalization. 
5) From the beginning, Daewoo relied on OEM to export. The first was with the G.E. and 
radios. Later, it supplied amplifiers to Germany's Telefunken and Zenith of the U.S. By 
1982, DEC diversified itself as a comprehensive consumer electronics maker, exporting 
televisions, VCRs, cassette recorders, car stereos, refrigerators, and washers. 
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Table 1  Growth of DEC During the 1980s  
(unit: ?100 million) 
Item 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total ('83-'87) 
Sales  1,800 3,800 5,900 9,000 12,000 32,500 
Exports 850 1,780 3,000 4,800  6,600 17,030 
Investments 130   405   590   785  560   2,470 
- Facilities 35   160   150 55  40      440 
- Equipments 55  155   310  560 300   1,380 
- R&D  40 90 130  170  220      650 
Source: Daewoo Group (1998). 
 
production capability, due largely to its 'deep pocket' advantage as a chaebol, 
in addition to government incentives.6)  The rapid growth of DEC occurred 
during the 1980s with increased exports and product diversification, as 
shown in the table below.    
In comparison to the 1970s, sales have increased dramatically, fuelled by 
acquisitions and the expanding domestic market.  The R&D expenditure 
during the mid-1980s increased five-fold, yet it mostly remained around two 
percent of total sales, while the expenditure on equipment was about four 
percent.  The table above shows that the R&D share of total sales ($4.8 
billion) has increased to about ten percent to over $500 million, a rapid rise 
from the two percent average during the 1980s.  Nevertheless, the figures 
also indicate that DEC's R&D investment during the earlier learning period 
was not as extensive.   
NEC Corporation was founded in 1899 (NEC, 1998).  Originally called 
Nippon Electric Company, it was the first Japanese joint venture with foreign 
participation.  Its partner was the Western Electric Company (presently 
known as AT&T Technologies, Inc.) of the United States.  NEC's first 
overseas sales office was established in Seoul, Korea in 1908 when Korea 
was under Japanese rule.  In 1924, NEC entered the radio communication 
                                                
6) During this period, Daewoo assembled over 1.5 million television sets, 60,000 video-
cassette recorders, 1.8 million cassettes, 240,000 radios, 400,000 refrigerators, and 600,000 
car-stereos. By 1987, television production increased to 2.4 million and video-cassette 
recorders to 420,000 (Daewoo Group 1998). 
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industry and formed a close alliance with the Sumitomo industrial group, 
while loosening its ties with Western Electric as well as the ITT Corporation.  
NEC became a public company in 1949 and by 1954 had entered the 
computer industry.  As a leader of technology in fields of communications, 
computers, semiconductors, and other electronics, NEC posted sales of $43.4 
billion in 1996.       
 
3.2. OEM-Induced Technological Tutorial 
 
When NEC looks for OEM suppliers, the most important qualities are, in 
order of importance: (i) quality of products, (ii) price of products, and (iii) 
reliable delivery.  The process begins with NEC purchasing samples from 
potential suppliers.  After rating their quality, NEC compares prices, which 
then leads to negotiations with a small number of potential suppliers.  In 
choosing it Korean suppliers, NEC is especially concerned about their use of 
what its engineers call 'internal technology', such as semiconductors and 
quality control.  On average, NEC sends around ten engineers to its 
suppliers for technological inspection and tutorials for about one month every 
year.  NEC actually has a formal training program for its engineers on 
tutoring the OEM suppliers, but the details are not released to the public.   
NEC at first buys only one product/model and then expands the 
relationship if it proves successful.  Currently, in consumer electronics, NEC 
deals mainly with DEC and L.G. of Korea, as well as with some smaller 
Japanese firms.  Usually, the Korean firms initiate the contact process with 
NEC.  In negotiating OEM contracts, one key issue is to choose an exchange 
rate on which to base the arrangement.  NEC also considers the management 
capabilities of the suppliers.  In consumer electronics, NEC notes that 
market demands change very quickly.  Hence, the need for the suppliers to 
change along with the buyers is critical.  In fact, NEC notes that one of the 
main reasons why DEC became its main OEM supplier in consumer 
electronics was because their management was more flexible with the 
arrangement than others.  NEC believes that OEM provides a good 
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opportunity to exchange (or combine) their brand image and marketing 
networks for the Koreans's low costs and efficient production capabilities.  
The fact that NEC can attain quality goods at low prices allows it to seek 
OEM rather than its own FDI.  This way, according to NEC, it can avoid the 
cost of setting up FDI operations in Korea.  Furthermore, the FDI option 
became even more limited because of the Korean government's restrictive 
policies.  This made OEM a more feasible choice for NEC to benefit from 
the location advantage that Korea could offer.   
In transferring technology, NEC stresses the necessity of 'face-to-face' 
interaction.  Technologies cannot be learned via simply transferring 
blueprints or components.  Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish when 
technological transfer and learning actually occur.  Clearly, learning does 
not occur automatically with the purchase of technology (in capital goods, 
etc.).  Such learning/tutoring is an incremental and interactive process, 
involving many face-to-face discussions and much trial-and-error.   
NEC asserts that most consumer electronics, such as television sets and 
videocassette recorders, now have standardized technologies.  However, 
there are still many areas for improvement.  In addition to audio and visual 
qualities, energy savings is now becoming more important.  Beyond 
offering advice on product technologies, NEC feels that it has improved 
DEC's production capabilities considerably.  For example, NEC helped 
DEC to create a quality control system that directly connects its R&D 
laboratories (designs) to the assembly lines (production).  NEC found that 
while DEC had a reasonable level of quality control, it still produced many 
faulty products.  To solve this problem, NEC asked DEC to implement 
modified NEC-style production lines.  The new line allows each worker to 
have a particular responsibility, while maintaining the close teamwork 
important to high productivity.  This in turn allowed each team to identify 
the source of the faults and ways to correct them.  Implementing such new 
methods was neither easy nor quick.  Many Koreans initially resisted the 
advice of the Japanese engineers.  Yet, in the end, the implementation 
helped DEC to become a more effective producer.             
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NEC faced increasing competition from other Asian countries, such as 
China, using low wages as their main competitive advantage.  However, the 
higher TCs of Korean firms (as its OEM suppliers) put them at an advantage 
when compared to the Chinese firms's lower product quality and less reliable 
delivery.  Another concern is the quality of components.  When products 
are assembled in a particular country, the firms are likely to use many 
intermediate goods from the same country.  In a country of low TC, not only 
do the assemblers tend to be technologically inferior, but intermediate goods 
are likely to be faulty as well.  This leads to faulty final products and 
delivery delays.  NEC demands certain fault rates from its OEM suppliers, 
although these vary according to product and supplier. 
It seems that to NEC and perhaps other Japanese firms as well, the 
increasing TCs of Korean firms through OEM is not a major concern.  
Korean firms still have weak brand image and marketing capabilities.  NEC, 
therefore, mainly sees the Korean challenge not as a threat but as a 
motivation for it to create new products and technologies.  Although the 
Japanese government at times attempts to restrict the outflow of technologies, 
some actually suggest that a greater flow of technology is better and that 
Japan needs to be the center of an 'Asian technology system'.   
 
3.3. OEM-Induced Technological Learning 
 
DEC's OEM arrangement with NEC of Japan started in 1981.7)  
According to the executives and engineers at Daewoo Television Research 
Center, NEC contacted DEC for an OEM arrangement because the high 
wages in Japan was preventing it from manufacturing mid-priced televisions 
on its own.  NEC chose DEC with the help of outside consultants because, 
                                                
7) Of course, NEC is not Daewoo's only partner. For Daewoo, from colour monitors with RCA, 
to VCRs with Toshiba, air conditioners with G.E., personal computers with Fujitsu, and 
digital transmission equipment with Northern Telecom, creating and fostering global 
networks is an essential component of the firm's technology development. For the European 
market, it is also linked with Japan's Hitachi and Matsushita. Most of Daewoo's consumer 
electronics are exported under OEM. 
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as a chaebol, it was considered to have stable management and a capacity for 
large-scale production.  Management stability and production capability 
were both seen as more important than DEC's initial TC since NEC had plans 
for active supervision of technology and quality control.   
As is common for OEM suppliers, DEC provided prototype samples of 
their own 19-inch color televisions to be tested by NEC engineers.  Prior to 
the arrangement with NEC, DEC was already manufacturing televisions for 
the domestic market and even exporting some to Australia.  DEC had 
previously acquired its TCs through imitative reverse engineering and 
licensing a few key technologies.  However, the technology transfer was not 
sufficient and the samples suffered from numerous inadequacies.8) To the 
surprise of DEC executives, NEC found over eighty problems, ranging from 
poor audio quality to faulty control knobs, with their television samples.  In 
fact, lacking in experience and TCs, the DEC engineers state that (they) 
' …could not solve the problems ourselves, but were also unclear about 
knowing what to ask NEC so they can help us solve them...' Nevertheless, 
NEC was convinced that DEC could become a good OEM supplier and thus 
moved to establish the relationship.  NEC assigned a group of engineers 
from Japan to the Daewoo Television Research Center.  While the Japanese 
engineers were prohibited from revealing sensitive technologies, the 
relationship that was formed between NEC and DEC engineers fostered a 
high degree of tacit transfer of knowledge, experience, and know-how, as 
well as some technology blue-prints.  As both parties had an interest in 
DEC's technology development and production of high quality goods, 
intensive interactions akin to technological apprenticeship took place.9)   
The extent of technology transfer affected the price set for OEM 
transaction.  When the potential for TL was significant, DEC reduced the 
                                                
8) Until the rapid TL from OEM occurred, one Daewoo engineer notes that its products were 
simply 'inferior imitations', sold overseas with lower prices. He also suggested that the 
earlier management lacked the genuine appreciation for technology, erroneously equating 
increasing exports with TCs. 
9) Daewoo engineers note that about half of the corrections requested require a significant 
improvement in their TCs, while the rest only requires minor adjustments. 
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price of its OEM products to win the contract.  There were a number of 
other factors which determined the price at which OEM products were 
contracted.  Firstly, the capability of the supplier is important; if the firm is 
reputed to be a reliable  and capable supplier, it can command higher prices.  
Secondly, the products themselves are considered; when sophisticated 
technologies are involved, the suppliers can claim higher margins.  Thirdly, 
the quantity of the orders; the larger the order, the lower the price set by the 
suppliers.  Lastly, the demand from the buyers to install new capital goods 
and facilities; the higher this demand, the higher the price becomes.   
Technologically, televisions can be divided into four different quality 
categories: (i) visual quality, (ii) audio quality, (iii) safety, and (iv) overall 
design.  As they believe that the core TCs are deeply rooted in experience, 
DEC engineers received much help from NEC in all these categories.  For 
instance, in measuring the quality of sound and vision, DEC engineers 
initially relied on their 'eyes and ears'.  Then their NEC counterparts 
introduced much more accurate electronic measuring devices.  At the time, 
the Koreans had no idea that such devices existed.  DEC adopted the 
devices and made them a part of its routine, having been instructed how to 
use them (i.e.: routinized TL) by NEC engineers.  This routine had a 
spillover effect on other, non-OEM products as well.   
DEC engineers maintain that the technologies and knowledge acquired 
from NEC were more significant than those from government research 
institutes (GRIs) or universities.  Specific technical tasks (such as enhancing 
audio quality at a certain level) can be as complex and elusive as the effort to 
understand the science behind commercial technology, and no 'blue-print' 
may exist for such tasks.  Interacting with engineers with more experience 
and knowledge is an invaluable way to learn, making stable technical 
assistance critical for technology transfer.  Such technological assistance 
does not come only through OEM; they can also be found in licensing or 
importing capital goods.  However, OEM tends to be more long term and 
can cover a wide-ranging spectrum of technologies.  It also involves more 
detailed diagnostic analysis of a firm's TC needs and methods to solve 
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technological problems, preferably interacting with more experienced and 
knowledgeable technicians and engineers.  Thus, it is no surprise that DEC 
purchases much of its required technologies from the OEM buyers.  Other 
transfer modes tend not to be as useful in these areas.  International 
licensing, for instance, is often narrower in scope and the suppliers involved 
vary.10) Technology licensers do not usually involve themselves in the wide-
ranging technological needs of licensees over a long period of time.11) 
Training offered by the licensers only concerns the licensed products; little 
else is addressed.   
Perhaps the most important learning benefits of OEM are setting 'higher 
standards' for technologies and product quality.  DEC could import or 
license some technologies from abroad, but identifying and reaching specific, 
tangible targets to enhance its TCs were not easy.  Such targets also 
determined the technologies to be imported.  Through OEM, the most 
important aspects of TL were adopting the buyer's technological standards 
and acquiring its methods of research and development, as well as testing and 
quality control methods.  This has been very effective and efficient since the 
buyers, more than anyone else, could best locate DEC's weaknesses as well 
as the needed paths for TL.  Thus, the first step towards enhancing TL 
capability via this partnership was the full technological diagnostic review of 
the learner by the tutor.  This allowed DEC's learning to become more 
targeted and efficient.  Afterwards, DEC needed ten to fifteen years to learn 
and fully internalize (and routinize) the technological standards of their OEM 
partners.12) This is not to suggest, however, that the firm's TCs are now as 
high as those of NEC.  Rather, DEC developed the capabilities sufficient to 
learn and absorb more sophisticated technologies.  This was also seen in 
DEC's increased exports and R&D investments over time, as shown earlier.   
                                                
10) As noted earlier, the information failure on attaining technologies through licensing also 
hampered Daewoo's ability to seek this route (by increasing their transaction cost in 
acquired licensed technology). 
11) The exception is when OEM buyers also become licensers. 
12) One executive even said, '… transfer of technology can only happen between people, not 
between documents ...' 
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The OEM-induced TL from the buyers was most active during the 1980s.  
There were about ten separate meetings between the engineers, lasting for 
more than thirty days per year.  During the meeting, various technology 
issues surrounding the OEM products were discussed and resolved.  Such 
learning arrangements have been very effective according to DEC and more 
extensive and broad in scope compared to the others induced by technology 
licensing.  One reason for this is the long-term relationship that developed 
between these two firms.  On average, DEC seeks OEM arrangements that 
last at least five years.   
TL was not the only motivation for DEC's seeking OEM.  Another was 
to expand export capabilities and markets.  The OEMs from NEC allowed 
DEC to enter more developed overseas markets.  With a presence in such 
markets, DEC was able to further study the latest technologies available.  
This led to the improvement of its own product development and marketing 
strategies, complemented by purchased technologies.13) Daewoo's brand 
image is weak in top export markets such as Japan, Europe, and the United 
States.  Improving brand image, marketing and operational networks are 
very costly tasks and OEM offers an efficient alternative in building 
marketing skills.  As an indication, DEC makes a larger profit from OEM 
products than from its own brands: it has been estimated that for a 19-inch 
color television, its OEM earns $109 in profits, while its own brand earns 
$95 only.  The difference is due to the marketing costs of own-brand 
exporting.  In fact, one DEC executive concludes that without OEM (to 
subsidize its own-brand exports), DEC could not have been a successful 
exporter, nor could it have sought product diversification.   
OEM itself poses challenges.  Constant negotiations with buyers take  
                                                
13) Daewoo continues to export own-brand televisions to the U.S. at a loss. This is felt 
necessary for long-term company growth. In order to enhance TC and brand image, they 
have to be present in the more developed markets. This shows the difficulties in OBM – 
even though Daewoo has attained a considerable degree of marketing capabilities via OEM.  
Due to the high costs involved, like many other Korean firms, Daewoo has decided to 
combine the two (OEM and OBM) modes of exports.  As indicated later, while some 
OEM buyers place certain restrictions on OBM exports, it does not seem to be a major 
problem for the Korean firms – especially since such agreements have time limitations. 
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place on price, quality, and specifications.  An important issue is the defect 
rate in products.  NEC demanded that DEC maintain a fault rate of 1/500.  
While DEC agreed to this as the ideal, its immediate achievement was very 
costly.  A further problem is the variability in quantities ordered.  This 
poses capacity problems when buyers demand increased production from 
suppliers.  Despite such problems, the freedom gained by DEC from 
marketing, distribution, and after-sales networks in OEM allowed them to 
concentrate their resources in enhancing technological and production 
capabilities.  By the end of 1997, the OEM relationship with NEC ended as 
the Japanese firm decided to withdraw from the television market.  DEC 
quickly secured another long-term contract with Sony, a larger and 
technologically advanced OEM buyer.  This was a clear indication of DEC's 
enhanced TCs and reputation within the IPN.     
To summarize, OEM has enhanced DEC's competitiveness and has 
allowed its production technology to reach capability levels that are 
comparable to other leading firms.  Today, DEC has one of the largest 
production capacities in the world.  Inspite of this, however, DEC has yet to 
achieve its goal of technological 'independence'.14)  While DEC claims that 
about ninety percent of key technologies are produced within the firm, the 
two fundamental areas where improvements are needed are intermediate 
goods technology (especially the memory and signal-related integrated 
circuits) and design capabilities.  Because DEC still depends on foreign 
technology to meet its needs in those two areas, it trails behind its rivals in 
the development of new products.  A third area of weakness is basic 
scientific research and capability.  This means that the firm still lags behind 
in technological creativity (or innovation), the key component of design 
capability.  Nevertheless, it should not mean that the limitations on 
technological independence were due to OEM (i.e., 'OEM Trap') as argued 
by Ernst.  As the case study indicates, OEM has allowed for enhancement 
                                                
14) Daewoo considers its final goal to be full technological independence, to have the capacity 
to produce all of the technologies it needs. Its executives believe that the continued import 
of technologies has kept Korean firms behind their foreign rivals (in terms of new product 
development). 
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of DEC's TCs, it seems that its marketing and exporting costs have become a 





This study began with the question of how a Korean electronics firm was 
able to become an effective learner despite a low inflow of formal (hardware) 
technologies.15)  It is argued that DEC's participation into the IPN via OEM 
has been the indispensable component behind its TL capabilities acquisition.  
The OEM arrangement has worked well for the Korean electronics industry 
because, as a mode for technology transfer, it combined the incentives (and 
capabilities) of both buyers and suppliers for effective TL.  As up to 80 
percent of the industry's export was through OEM, its significance is clearly 
indicated.  The case study verified this with the analyses of the TL efforts of 
DEC's major export item in television.  
The case study also showed the significance of the tacitness challenge of 
TL, and through the analytical framework and case study, it analyzed how the 
incentives of OEM buyers allowed Japan's NEC to become an effective and 
necessary tutor.  Tacitness in technology causes one of the most significant 
difficulties for firms attempting to learn.  This means that firms are not 
always clear on what can be embedded within a given technology.  
Knowledge of this is essential, since it allows them to fully absorb, adapt, 
and later innovate from the technology.  The case study verifies this and 
shows that DEC has been able to overcome the tacitness cha llenge in TL via 
their interactive learning through OEM. 
Largely stemming from this 'tacitness' challenge, the study also shows a 
certain limitation on 'self learning' (reverse engineering, imitations, etc.), 
mainly because the firms lacked clear knowledge of each technology.  The 
                                                
15) Daewoo Group, after the financial crisis of 1997, was disbanded. DEC is now operated 
more independently, with a level of foreign ownership. This issue is not addressed here as it 
is beyond the scope of this study. 
Jin W. Cyhn 218 
tacit and implicit elements of the technologies discourage the learners from 
benefiting from them fully.  As discussed, this is especially important since 
the transfer of TCs (and 'codifying' them), rather than mere hardware, has 
been the key challenge for the recipients.  When foreign engineers 
explained the scientific and engineering details (also based on experience and 
know-how) behind the technologies, Korean engineers were better able to 
absorb the technologies and modify them further.  Receiving assistance 
from the originator of the technology (i.e., MNEs) is not sufficient for 
effective TL.  However, with the Korean firms willing to invest heavily in 
learning, it seems that such 'interactive learning' with the foreign MNEs 
became an essential component of their TL success.16)  
One of the first and most critical steps of IPN (OEM)-induced learning is 
the in-depth technological diagnosis that the MNEs can provide.  This is an 
important step towards effective learning since, partially due to technology's 
tacitness, the learners are not always clear about what and how to learn, nor 
are they clear about their overall TL capabilities.  One example from the 
case study is that DEC engineers were surprised that the NEC engineers 
found over 80 problems associated with the television set that were being 
exported already.  As the provider of technology usually possesses more 
information compared to the recipient, the latter struggles to fully exploit the 
technology's potential.  This problem is more acute for DC firms, with their 
lack of capabilities, information, and resources.  Furthermore, even if the 
transferors are willing to give as much information as possible, many of the 
capabilities that are mostly based on experience or know-how cannot be 
explicitly written down in 'blue-prints'.  Thus, while many factors 
traditionally considered important for TL – such as R&D investments – are 
indeed important, learning also involves and requires active interactions with 
                                                
16) A counter-evidence (i.e., what would have happened if DEC did not engage  in OEM) is not 
available for comparative analysis.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to state that a majority 
of electronics exports during the period of through OEM – and thus DEC was not alone in 
this effort.  Although it is beyond the scope of this article, another study (Cyhn 2002) finds 
that those without similar interactive learning processes led to much difficulties and even 
failures. 
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foreign technologies and their originators. 
As analyzed, the transfer of technology not only involves hardware (in 
equipment) or blue-prints, but embodied experience and know-how as well.  
It is noteworthy that while licensed technologies allowed many Korean firms 
to initiate the product development process, it was insufficient – as noted by 
over 80 problems identified in the DEC television sets.  Both firms began 
manufacturing those products with licensed technologies and some imitative 
reverse engineering.  This is why this study compares TL to learning how to 
cook: even if all the ingredients and instructions can be obtained, they may 
not necessarily result in a gourmet dish.  There are other elements in 
cooking that cannot be clearly written down or fully absorbed by the learners 
quickly.  Similarly, TL entails a great deal of trial-and-error, with interactive 
learning from the 'teacher'.  While some can quickly sweep this process 
away as a function of capital investment, it can be seen that it requires a 
much more complex analysis. 
This article  also argues that OEM is not merely a form of subcontracting 
but that it is part of broader global phenomena within IPN.  From a 
technology-centered perspective, it seems that no firm (or country) is totally 
independent of others' knowledge.  This means that a key challenge for the 
East Asians' development process involves learning how they can benefit 
from this active flow of technology, beyond the necessity of creating 
technologies of their own.  This increasing economic globalization has had a 
significant influence on the industrialization of DCs – and for this article , the 
issue of TL and TC transfer through OEM is highlighted.  Indeed, UNCTAD 
states that international production – the production of goods and services in 
countries that is controlled and managed by firms headquartered in other 
countries – is at the core of the process of globalization.   
This article  has further revealed that two factors determine the success of 
OEM and subsequent accumulation of competitiveness: capabilit ies and 
incentives.  The East Asian firms were able to enter the IPN via OEM 
because they had a high degree of TCs compared to other DCs (even though 
their wages/costs are much lower).  Then, in serving as the OEM suppliers, 
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their TCs gave the MNEs more 'incentives' to further transfer the 
technologies and TCs that have been the foundation for the success of many 
East Asian firms.  This way, the East Asian firms have not only been able to 
transform their comparative advantage from one of low wages to one of high 
TCs, but they have also been able to learn and overcome many of the tacit 
elements in technologies as well.  The capabilities of learners and the 
incentives of MNEs have further fostered successful development in East 
Asia – working as collaborators rather than as competitors/distant 
subcontractors has been one of the key factors behind its success.               
Two important (cautionary) notes before attempting to benefit from this 
form of economic globalization need to be made.  First, as technology has 
become a more important proprietary good, firms are more protective of it.  
This is ironic since this increasing importance and protection is coupled with 
the free flow of technologies worldwide.  Indeed, when MNEs export 
technologies, they take full advantage of the 'ignorance' of DCs as 
technology importers.  One Korean engineer notes that 'the (technology) 
exporter does not disclose the scope and characteristics of the technology 
when he signs a contract'; nor is the price for technology fixed in the 
international market: the price differs according to who wants it and how 
badly (Interview).  It may be beyond the scope of this study to extensively 
analyze both the opportunities and inequalities involved in this economic 
globalization, but by taking a narrower view of OEM, it seems clear that a 
certain level of initial TCs is a necessary entrance condition.  It is no 
coincidence that Japan's OEM has been mostly geared towards East Asia, 
despite their relatively higher wages than those of other DCs.    
Second, statistics indicate that, while MNEs' sales activities are global, 
their technological activities tend to be home-based.  From 1980 to 1989, the 
DC firms only participated in 1.5 percent of total partnerships.  Those 
involving the U.S., the E.U., and Japan amount to almost sixty percent of the 
total.  Furthermore, ninety-eight percent of the MNEs' overseas research 
institute laboratories are located in OECD or NIC sites (Freeman and 
Hagedoorn, 1995, p. 43).  Thus, the promise of a global economy with a 
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freer flow of technologies to the The East Asians has yet to reach its full 
promise since the capacity to absorb the technologies is still limited for them.  
In addition, within this network there is still a need for location advantage; 
the MNEs would seek partnerships with the DC firms only for their low costs 
(wages).  This also means that this type of partnership may not necessarily 
enhance TCs at the national level.  Thus, while opportunities for learning 
and development may be present within the network, they may not actually 
be realized.  The experience shows that when MNEs only seek a low cost 
advantage, most of the technology-related activities are not diffused to the 





Amsden, A., Asia's Next Giant, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Amsden, A. and L. Kim, "A Technological Perspective on the General 
Machinery Industry in the Republic of Korea," in M. Fransman, ed., 
Machinery and Economic Development, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1986. 
Arrow, K., "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Review of 
Economic Studies, 29(3), 1962, pp. 155-173. 
Bell, M. and K. Pavitt, "Technological Accumulation and Industrial Growth," 
in D. Archibugi and J. Michie, eds., Technology, Globalization and 
Economic Performance. D. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993.  
Blois, K. J., "Vertical Quasi-Integration," Journal of Industrial Economics, 
20(3), 1972, pp. 252-272.  
Borrus, Michael, Dieter Ernst, and Stephan Haggard, International 
Production Networks in Asia: Rivalry or Riches?, London: Routledge, 
2000.  
Cyhn, J., Technology Transfer and International Production: A Case Study of 
Korea's Electronics Industry, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 2002. 
Jin W. Cyhn 222 
Daewoo Group (various years), Annual Company Report.  
Dahlman, C., B. Ross-Larson, and L. Westphal, "Managing Technological 
Development: Lessons from the Newly Industrializing Countries," 
World Development, 15(6), 1985, pp. 759-779.  
Dahlman, C. and L. Westphal, "The Transfer of Technology," Finance and 
Development, 20(4), 1981, pp. 6-9.  
Enos, J. L., Petroleum and Progress and Profits: A History of Process 
Innovation, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962.  
Ernst, D., What are the Limits to the Korean Model? The Korean Electronics 
Industry Under Pressure, California: BRIE Research Paper, 1994. 
Fransman, M., "Conceptualizing Technical Change in the Third World in the 
1980s: An Interpretative Survey," Journal of Development Studies, 
21(4), 1985, pp. 572-652.  
Freeman, C. and J. Hagedoorn, "Catching Up or Falling Behind: Patterns in 
International Interfirm Technology Partnering," World Development, 
22(5), 1994, pp. 771-780.  
Hobday, M., "Technological Learning from Singapore: A Test-Case of 
Leapfrogging," Journal of Development Studies, 20(3), 1994, pp. 
831-858.  
Hobday M., Innovation in East Asia , Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995. 
Katz, J., "Domestic Technological Innovations and Dynamic Comparative 
Advantage," Journal of Development Economics, 16(1), 1984, pp. 13-
37.  
______, Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries, 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.  
Kim, L., From Imitation to Innovation, Massachusetts: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1997. 
Lall, S., "Vertical Inter-Firm Linkages in LDCs: An Empirical Study," 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 42(3), 1980, pp. 203-226.  
______, "Multinationals and Technology Development in Host LDCs," in 
John Dunning, ed., Structural Change, Economic Interdependence 
and World Development, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.  
Tutoring Technology through OEM Arrangement 223 
______, "Technological Capabilities and Industrialization," World 
Development, 20(2), 1992, pp. 165-186. 
Lee, J., T. Bae, and D. Choi, "Technology Development Processes: A Model 
for a Developing Country with a Global Perspective," R&D 
Management, 18(3), 1988, pp. 78-102. 
NEC, The Company Report, Tokyo, 1998.  
Pavitt, K., "Technology Transfer among the Industrially Advanced Countries: 
An Overview," in N. Rosenberg and C. Frischtak, eds., International 
Technology Transfer: Concepts, Measures, and Comparisons, New 
York: Praeger, 1985. 
Stewart, F., "International Technology Transfer: Issues and Policy Options," 
Background Paper for World Bank Development Report, 1979.  
Stiglitz, J., Economic Organization, Information and Development, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.  
Teitel, S., "Productivity, Mechanization and Skills: A Test of the Hirschman 
Hypothesis for Latin American Industry," World Development, 9(4), 
1981, pp. 63-94.  
Teubal, M., Innovation Performance, Learning, and Government Policy: 
Selected Essays. Maddison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.  
United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Annual Report, Paris, 
1980.  
Westphal, L., C. Dahlman, and L. Kim, "Reflections on the Republic of 
Korea's Acquisition of Technological Capability," in N. Rosenberg 
and C. Frischtak, eds., International Technology Transfer: Concepts, 
Measures, and Comparisons, New York: Praeger, 1985. 
Williamson, O., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: 
Macmillan, 1985. 
Wortzel, H. and S. Wortzel, "Strategies for Innovation in Developing 
Countries," Sloan Management Review, 19(1), 1981, pp. 251-281. 
